Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. Examples include regional Governments offering their own funding competitions for research projects, besides general funding opportunities from the central Government; international awards complemented by a prize for national competitors; the World Chess Championship offering additional competitions for specific groups; or a prize for the best paper by a young scientist. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the incentive effects of this affirmative action instrument. Our main result is to show that this policy is not only appealing from a normative point of view but can also enhance competition. It can thus be desirable on efficiency grounds, fostering thereby the social acceptance of the policy.
We analyse the effects of extra prizes in a contest model. These models have been insightful in a variety of competitive situations, including rent-seeking, promotional competition, labour market tournaments, sports competitions or conflict. Following Stein (2002) or Franke et al. (2013) , we investigate an asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in ability. Agents with relatively low ability belong to a 'disadvantaged minority'.
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A standard result in contest theory says that the most inefficient (or least able) agents might not actively participate in the competition (Stein 2002) . And indeed, 'minority representation' is an important concern in real competitions. For instance, in California the Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise and Small Business Certification Programs establish explicit target market shares for these disadvantaged groups. Similarly, the European Union has target shares for female representation on firms' boards and some universities in the U.K. have widening participation programs aiming at broadening the range of students who attend university so that they are representative of the home population. The challenge is then to design affirmative action policies that can reconcile the conflicting aims of reaching both (i) a sufficient level of minority representation and (ii) a sufficient level of competition.
Avoiding trade-offs between these objectives is important because it influences the political support for and the prevalence of affirmative action policies. Ayres and Cramton (1996) , for example, report that various California ballot initiatives tried to end state-sponsored af-1 For a survey of the contest literature see Konrad (2009) . See also Cornes and Hartley (2005) and Ryvkin (2013) for general models of asymmetric contests. Throughout the paper we follow the language of the affirmative action literature and use for example the term 'disadvantaged minority' for the agents favoured through affirmative action.
firmative action because of the belief that eliminating affirmative action could help to solve budget problems.
In our model the contest designer can create an extra prize at the cost of reducing the prize in the main competition. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. This fits, for example, quotas for disadvantaged minorities, like gender quotas, in which the establishment of the quota reduces the budget available in the main competition. Disadvantaged agents thus should have an incentive to exert higher effort but it is far from obvious that the overall level of competition will be strengthened, as advantaged agents have lower incentives to invest.
We show that disadvantaged agents indeed do have an incentive to exert higher effort and that we can think of the effects of extra prizes 'as raising the ability of disadvantaged agents'. In this sense extra prizes create a 'level playing field', as the 'abilities' of contestants become more homogeneous. This leads to our first major result that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. With an extra prize of moderate size both groups of agents are active; using the language of the affirmative action literature, there is diversity. Moreover, as the extra prize becomes larger, the incentives of advantaged agents to participate decline and the least able active advantaged agents drop out, while for advantaged agents the opposite happens. The incentives to participate increase and the most able inactive disadvantaged agents become active.
Our main result is to show that extra prizes have the potential to strengthen the overall level of competition. The reason is that, as the disadvantaged minority competes stronger, advantaged agents might exert more effort than they otherwise would, resulting in a higher overall level of competition. More precisely, we show that for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest (for example in Stein 2002) . We also show by means of an example that the magnitude of the increase of total effort due to the extra prize might potentially be quite important. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition.
We are not aware of an empirical study that fits exactly our model. The predictions of our model are, however, in line with empirical evidence. Brown (2011) shows that large differences in ability might reduce effort. Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) provide experimental evidence that related (but different) affirmative action policies can have an important impact on minority participation, while not harming the efficiency of the competition, as predicted by our model.
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A distinctive feature of our model is that some agents might win more than one prize with a sole effort choice. In some situations this is a reasonable description of reality. For instance, in chess the World Championship does not exclude women, juniors or seniors, but each of these groups have in addition their separate championship. In Spain some (but not all) regional levels of Government (Comunidades Autónomas) provide research funding, in addition to funding from the central Government. In 2011, the Catalan film 'Black Bread' won both the (Spanish) Goya Award and the (Catalan) Gaudí Award in the category of Best Film.
3 In 2009, a local firm won both the main (international) prize and the prize for Catalan competitors in the fireworks contest organized yearly by the City Council of Tarragona. 4 In 2013, a prominent firm organized a photo competition in
Germany that awarded both a main annual prize and a secondary monthly prize, based on a single submission. 5 Currently, entrepreneurs younger than 40 years have access to a special competition in order to obtain funding for the establishment of companies, in addition to the main competition organized by the Spanish Ministry of Industry.
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Another aspect of our model is that some agents only compete for the main prize, while others compete for the main and the extra prize. This might capture interesting aspects of some competitions. Consider a quota system. At the time of investment (for example in education) minority members might still have the option of participating as a minority member, in addition to participating in the main competition. Consider widening participation programs of universities. Universities prioritize applicants based on exam grades but might trade-off grades obtained in a less advantaged family environment, so that some applications compete in the main competition and in a widening participation program.
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Consider the Spanish research programme 'Proyectos Europa Excelencia'. In order to com-2 See also Schotter and Weigelt (1992) , Franke (2012b) and Calsamiglia et al. (2013) to create a 'level playing field' and thereby to lead to more intense competition, including subsidies to high-cost suppliers (Ewerhart and Fieseler 2003; Rothkopf et al. 2003) , bid preferences and other biases in the selection of the winner (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Baik 1994; Ayres and Cramton 1996; Fu 2006; Fain 2009; Franke 2012a; Pastine and Pastine 2012; Franke et al. 2013; Ridlon and Shin 2013; Lee 2013) , share auctions (Alcalde and Dahm 2013) , and the handicap or even exclusion of the most efficient participant (Baye et al. 1993; Che and Gale 2003; Kirkegaard 2012) . 9 To the best of our knowledge the affirmative action policy considered here has not been analysed before.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the optimal prize structure in contests (e.g. Glazer and Hassin 1988; Clark and Riis 1998b; Moldovanu and Sela 2001; Szymanski and Valletti 2005; Moldovanu and Sela 2006; Azmat and Möller 2009; Fu and Lu 2009; Möller 2012) , because the introduction of an extra prize establishes a specific prize struc-8 There are also situations which might be interpreted as being the opposite to affirmative action, because the most efficient agents have access to extra prizes. Consider (European) football teams and their investment in players. All teams compete in the national leagues. In addition, however, the best teams compete in European competitions, like the Champions League. Or consider elite colleges that have a bias in favour of applicants who are children of alumni. 9 DeFraja (2005) also provides an efficiency argument for affirmative action. His argument, however, is not based on levelling the playing field but builds on asymmetric information of the individual's potential to benefit from education. We comment further on the relationship to Baye et al. (1993) ture. Our model, however, differs from this literature by allowing for some contestants to win more than one prize with a sole effort choice.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section collects our assumptions and fixes notation. We conduct our strategic analysis in Section 3. The last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix. 
The Model
There is an observable characteristic that distinguishes agents in such a way that they can be partitioned into two groups, N = M ∪ D. We interpret D as the disadvantaged group that is the objective of affirmative action. For this reason we assume that agents in M = {1, 2, ..., m} have higher ability than agents in D = {m + 1, ..., n}. 12 To distinguish our setting from a standard contest we suppose 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 2.
The contest designer aims to maximize total effort by choosing β ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter β divides the budget into two prizes: B 1 = (1 − β)B and B 2 = β B. Members of group M only compete for prize B 1 , while members of group D compete for both prizes. In this sense 10 There are a few models in which a contestant can win multiple prizes. But this requires allocating resources to different contests, as in Gradstein and Nitzan (1989) , or choosing effort twice, as in Sela (2012) .
There are also models in which the contest success function is biased towards some participant, see Franke et al. (2013) for a general model, Franke (2012a) for an affirmative action context and Farmer and Pecorino (1999) or Dahm and Porteiro (2008) for other environments. This is analytically different from creating an extra prize. The contest success function considered in the present paper is unbiased; see also footnote 23. 11 In the literature, the outcome of contests has been interpreted to capture either win probabilities or shares of a prize, see Corchón and Dahm (2010) . Since we assume that agents are risk neutral, we do not distinguish between both interpretations. Our model thus allows for contestants winning prizes with some probability, as in the case of the aforementioned film awards, or for agents winning shares of a overall budget, as in the case of quotas. 12 We take it as given that minority agents are (weakly) disadvantaged. See Holzer and Neumark (2000) , Fang and Moro (2010) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) for an assessment of the disadvantage in different contexts.
prize B 2 is an extra prize for group D. Notice that although an agent in D exerts effort only once, he might win both prizes. Note also that when β = 0 or β = 1 we have a standard contest without extra prize. 13 In order to focus on the effects of an extra prize we follow most of the literature and consider for each prize an imperfectly discriminating contest in which an agent i's share of the budget is proportional to his effort expended, see Tullock (1980) . 14 We introduce the following notation. A vector of individual efforts is denoted by e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) and total effort of a group G of agents is E G = k∈G e k . Similarly, the vector of abilities is denoted by α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ). Given a group of agents G with cardinality |G|, the harmonic mean of abilities is given by
In the contest with extra prize the expected payoff of player i is
where z i ∈ {0, 1} takes value 1 if and only if i ∈ D, and value 0 otherwise. Notice that in this formulation the win probabilities of the two prizes are independent. It is interesting to observe that our model also captures a situation in which a disadvantaged agent who wins the main prize also wins the extra prize. In such a situation the expected payoff of player i
which is equivalent to (1). 13 With the term standard contest we refer to a situation in which (given the value of β or the behaviour of other agents) the objective function of active agents reduces to the one in Stein (2002) . For simplicity of the exposition we exclude the case β = 1 from most of our derivations. Sometimes, however, it is convenient to include this case. The statements referring to β = 1 follow from Stein (2002) . 14 We follow most of the literature and assume that when in the competition for a prize none of k agent exerts effort, each agent wins the prize with probability 1/k. Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998a) provide axiomatic characterizations of the contest success function employed, while Corchón and Dahm (2010) give a micro-foundation for the interpretation that the outcome is the choice of a designer.
Strategic analysis
Our first result establishes that contests with extra prizes are a powerful tool to make sure that there will be minority representation, since the extra prize will not be uncontested.
Lemma 1. For any (α, B) at least two contestants participate in the contest. Moreover, if
For later reference we observe that Lemma 1 implies that E D > 0, if β > 0. In order to analyse participation in the contest further, we take the derivative of (1) and obtain
Given that (1) is concave in e i , the first-order conditions require that ∂ E i (e)/∂ e i = 0 if
Consider the agents in set M . For these agents condition (3) reduces to the familiar
see Stein (2002) . This implies that the higher the ability of an advantaged agent, the higher his equilibrium effort. If the ability of an agent is low enough, he does not participate. We denote by m * ∈ M the agent with e m * > 0 such that for all i < m * , e i > 0 and for all i ∈ M with i > m * , e i = 0. We denote by M m * ⊆ M or M * ⊆ M the set of active advantaged agents, depending on whether we wish to stress the identity of the active agents. If no advantaged agent is active, we set M * = and m * = 0.
Consider the agents in set D. Here condition (3) becomes
Again, equilibrium effort is ordered by ability. We define 
Note also that if β = 0 or no advantaged agent is active, (5) reduces to (4), as the contest with extra prize becomes a standard contest.
The aim of our strategic analysis is to show that contests with extra prize admit a unique equilibrium (a formal statement will be provided in Proposition 4), and to investigate the effects of an extra prize on participation (in Subsection 3.3) and on total effort (in Subsections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). Doing so, however, requires looking first at the two different types of equilibria that might arise. In the first type of equilibrium, only one group is active, and behaviour is similar to that in a standard contest. In the second, there is diversity and complex effects emerge. We start by analysing each type of equilibrium successively in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2.
Standard equilibria
There are two situations in which equilibria that appear in a contest with extra prize are similar to those in a standard contest. The first is the trivial case when β = 0; when there is no extra prize. In the second, members of the advantaged group are discouraged from participating because the extra prize is sufficiently large. With a large extra prize the prize in the main competition is very small and thus it might happen that no advantaged agent is active. In both cases our model reduces to a standard contest that has been analysed by Stein (2002) . For our purpose it is sufficient to summarize his results as follows.
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Lemma 2. [Stein, 2002] In a standard contest in which a group of agents P = {1, 2, . . . , p} competes for a prize B, the number of active players |P * | is larger than two and total equilibrium effort is given by
In order to describe when standard equilibria appear, it is useful to start with a definition. To do so denote the set of active disadvantaged agents when no advantaged agent
Definition 1. Let
Notice that Γ {1} = α 1 > 0 and |D * M * = | ≥ 2, implying that β is well defined. The following result establishes that in any contest, in addition to the trivial case when β = 0, there are situations in which standard equilibria emerge. Intuitively, in the equilibria described in Proposition 1 the extra prize is too large. The extra prize reaches the aim of inducing participation of the disadvantaged group but it does so by discouraging participation of members of the advantaged group. We turn now to more moderate extra prizes which generate equilibria in which members of both groups are active.
Equilibria with diversity
We start by defining a measure of minority representation, as the percentage of total effort that is expended by disadvantaged agents
We say that there is diversity if Ω / ∈ {0, 1}. For later reference, we observe that Proposition 2 implies that E N > E D > 0. In order to describe total equilibrium effort in an equilibrium with diversity, denote the number of active agents in the contest by |N * | = |M * | + |D * |.
Proposition 3. Let β ∈ (0, β). For any (α, B),
where
Notice that (7) includes the case in which only one disadvantaged agent is active. In this case increasing the extra prize establishes a transfer to the active disadvantaged agent and reduces the main prize in some proportion. Total effort, however, is like in a standard contest for a prize of size B 1 .
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We complete now the description of the candidate equilibrium for β ∈ (0, β). We will later confirm that this is indeed an equilibrium. A formal statement of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium will be provided in Proposition 4. Summing up (4) over all active advantaged agents and rearranging, we determine
and
The expressions for individual efforts of the active agents are obtained as follows. 18 First introducing (7) in (4) yields for i ∈ M * that
For i ∈ D we use (7) and (17), which we derive in Appendix A.4, in (5), obtaining
Since agents of the advantaged group only compete for one prize, only the win probability for prize B 1 is of interest. This is immediately determined. For i ∈ M * we have
Members of the disadvantaged group, however, have the chance to obtain two prizes, and thus two win probabilities. The win probability of agent i ∈ D * for prize B 1 is
17 See Claim 1 in Appendix A.5. 18 When there is no extra prize (β = 0) or when |D * | = 1 both expressions coincide and reduce to the one in Stein (2002) . The first observation follows from the fact that for β = 0 we have that B 2 = 0. For the second observation, notice that when |D * | = 1 by Claim 1 in Appendix A.5 we have that
and (9) reduces to (8).
while the win probability of agent i ∈ D * for prize B 2 is
Lastly, we state the expected equilibrium utilities of the active agents. For i ∈ M * we have
and for i ∈ D * one obtains
The effects of the extra prize on participation
We are now in a position to investigate the effects of the extra prize on participation. Remember that with the help of condition (4) we have already established that e i > 0 for i ∈ M requires sufficient ability
and thus e i > 0 for i ∈ M implies e j > 0 for j < i. Moreover, for disadvantaged agents a similar property holds; e i > 0 for i ∈ D requires Lastly, we multiply (11) by B 1 Ω/(B 1 Ω + B 2 ) and define for the disadvantaged agents i ∈ D the effective abilityα i as followŝ
So we can think of the participation decision of an agent as determined by comparing the contestant's ability to the right hand side of (10). For disadvantaged agents, however, the extra prize raises ability from α i toα i , contributing thereby to a more level playing field.
We summarize the preceding formally as 
holds and the largest index d
is true. To see this it is instructive to consider the derivative of the right hand side of both participation conditions (12) and (13) with respect to β. Since ∂ E N /B 1 /∂ β ≥ 0, the extra prize discourages participation of advantaged agents. For disadvantaged agents, however, there is a countervailing effect, because their effective abilityα i is also raised, as These two countervailing effects imply that extra prizes have the potential to induce participation of disadvantaged agents who are not active without such a prize and to discourage participation of advantaged agents who are active without such a prize. We will observe these forces in later sections in more specific settings.
We are now in a position to state formally existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. For β / ∈ (0, β) the result follows from Stein (2002 ) or Fang (2002 . For β ∈ (0, β) we provide in Appendix A.6 a proof proceeding in two steps. First, we confirm that the candidate strategies in (8) and (9) (8) and (9), while the other agents exert no effort.
The effects of the extra prize on total effort
We establish first the existence of an optimal size for the extra prize.
Proposition 5. For any (α, B), there is
The previous proposition establishes that a maximum is well defined. The fact that β * < β) follows from Fang's well known result that it is never optimal to exclude all advantaged agents (Fang, 2002) . Without further assumptions determining the optimal size of the extra prize is complex, because (as we will see for example in Example 4) total effort is not differentiable with respect to β. In light of this problem, we derive now a sufficient condition for β * > 0.
Given the participation condition (4), we can always find β = ε with ε > 0 but sufficiently close to zero such that the set of active agents will consist of the same set of agents as for β = 0, except when there was no minority representation (Proposition 2). In the latter case, at least the most efficient disadvantaged agent also becomes active. Formally, we define the following sets of agents. Let M * β=0
⊆ D be the sets of advantaged and disadvantaged agents that are active for β = 0, respectively. Let
be the most able of the disadvantaged agents. Notice that this set has at least cardinality one. The cardinality is higher when there is more than one agent with the highest ability.
In the following Proposition, M * ε , D * ε , and N * ε refer to M * β=0
, and M * ε
respectively. Lastly, we define the following numbers
Notice that when |M * ε
The previous Proposition requires |D * ε | > 1. This is a weaker condition than asking to have more than one agent with exactly ability α m+1 . It rules out situations in which only one disadvantaged agent is active. If |D * ε | = 1, increasing the extra prize establishes a transfer to the active disadvantaged agent and reduces the main prize in some proportion. Thus the contested rent is reduced and total effort declines.
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Proposition 6 provides a condition assuring that a revenue maximizing contest organizer finds it in his interest to establish an extra prize. Why does an extra prize have the potential to increase total effort? The reason is that an extra prize increases the effective abilityα i of disadvantaged agents. This balances the competition and results in higher total effort, provided condition (14) is fulfilled. For |D * ε | > 1, the latter condition requires that the ratio of harmonic means is strictly smaller than than one, because γ, δ and ζ are all strictly smaller than one. Thus, the minority must be disadvantaged, as it can be shown that
On the other hand, there is also a lower bound on the ratio of harmonic means, so that the disadvantage of the minority must be of an intermediate level. We will gain further intuition into condition (14) in what follows.
Homogeneity within groups
We consider now the case in which all agents in a given group have the same ability. Such a situation represents the benchmark of minimal heterogeneity in our model. We will see that condition (14) is also a necessary condition under this assumption. Suppose that α i = α for all i ∈ M and α i = α for all i ∈ D. We denote α/α ≡ α ∈ (0, 1].
Because of the symmetry within groups, conditions (4) and (5) imply that either all group members are active, or none is. So for β = 0 the set of active agents is either M or N . For β ∈ (0, β), the set of active agents is N , while for larger values for β only group D is active. Moreover, β simplifies to 1 − (n − m − 1)α/(n − m).
Consider now Proposition 6. Notice that if D is active, then by assumption at least two disadvantaged agents are expending effort; thus |D * ε | > 1 is always fulfilled. Straightforward algebra yields
The right hand side of this expression is strictly increasing in α. Moreover, it tends to zero when α goes to zero, and goes to one when α approaches one. Thus condition (14) 
Moreover, for any n and m, there exists α such that β * > 0.
The assumption of homogeneity within groups allows to strengthen Proposition 6 considerably. On one hand, condition (14) becomes also a necessary condition. On the other, for any configuration of groups there exist intermediate levels of disadvantage such that a revenue maximizing contest organizer finds it in his interest to establish an extra prize.
We provide now an example that provides further intuition into condition (15). Since for m = 1 the left hand side of condition (15) becomes zero, we consider m = 2. 22 We also set B = 1 and normalize α = 1, so that α = α. 
Heterogeneity within groups
We consider now very briefly the case in which agents in a group have different abilities.
We look at the simplest three agent setting in order to make the following two points.
Example 3 proves that Condition (14) can be informative in such a setting, while Example 4 shows that Condition (14) is no longer a necessary condition under this assumption. In both examples we set B = 1. We have seen that the introduction of an extra prize might increase total effort and participation. The preceding examples, however, have also shown that all combinations of these consequences are possible: both total effort and participation increase in Example 4; neither total effort nor participation increase in Example 2 for α = 0.9; total effort decreases while participation increases in Example 2 for α = 0.2; and lastly, total effort increases while participation remains unaffected in Example 3.
Conclusions
This paper analysed the effects of establishing an extra prize for disadvantaged agents in a contest model. We have shown that even very small extra prizes are very effective in making sure that there is minority representation in the competition. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, establishing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Extra prizes might therefore be designed purely on efficiency grounds, which should facilitate the social acceptance of this affirmative action policy.
But in the real world affirmative action is not designed purely on efficiency grounds.
In so far our assumption that the designer does not value minority representation at allwhich is captured supposing that he is only interested in total effort-is very conservative and even unrealistic. In reality, as in the aforementioned examples of California's Disabled
Veteran Business Enterprise and Small Business Certification Programs or the European
Union's target shares for female representation on firms' boards, he will be willing to tradeoff some effort for minority representation and thus might find it desirable to establish an extra prize even at the cost of some reduction in total effort.
An important result in contest theory is the exclusion principle, see Baye et al. (1993) .
This principle applies when the contest success function is responsive enough to effort, as in the all-pay auction (see Baye et al. 1993; Alcalde and Dahm 2007; and Alcalde and Dahm 2010) . It says that a contest designer might sometimes strengthen competition and increase total effort by excluding the contestant with the highest valuation from participating in the competition. For the contest success function employed in this paper, however, Fang (2002) has shown that the exclusion principle does not apply. Our analysis allows a deeper understanding of the forces underlying the exclusion principle. The reason is that establishing an extra prize reduces the main prize and partially excludes the most efficient competitor(s). As Fang (2002) has shown, complete exclusion is never beneficial. Partial exclusion, however, might foster competition and increase total effort. In this sense, a partial exclusion principle applies to Tullock contests.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future research. A first generalizes the contest structure to several extra prizes. Think of researchers competing with very similar research proposals for funding from local governments (the extra prizes) and from the central government (the main prize). What is the optimal degree of decentralization of research funds?
Another avenue endows the contest designer not only with the opportunity to create an ex-tra prize but also with the power to choose the contestants that qualify for it. What is the optimal set of agents competing for the extra prize?
A Appendix
In this Appendix we provide a proof for the results stated in the main text. In addition to the notation introduced there, we simplify mathematical expressions using
and, given a group G ∈ {N , M , D}, it will also prove useful to define a weighted harmonic mean of abilities as
In addition, we simplify vectors of individual efforts when we focus on an agent i using the shorter notation e = (e i , e −i ), where e −i = (. . . , e i−1 , e i+1 , . . . ).
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For β = 0, the statement follows from Stein (2002) . By way of contradiction let β > 0 and suppose that there is an equilibrium in which e i = 0 for all agents i ∈ D. Suppose some advantaged agent exerts effort (otherwise a standard argument applies and proves the lemma). Notice that EU i (e i , e −i ) = B 2 /(n − m). Consider the alternative effortẽ i = ε > 0.
This deviation yields
Since B 2 − ε/α i is larger than B 2 /(n − m) for ε small enough, an equilibrium cannot have
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the first statement. Since |D * M * = | ≥ 2, we have that Γ D * M * = > 0. Thus we have β < 1.
Consider now the second statement. It follows from Stein (2002) that if M * = no agent i ∈ D can profitably deviate from the strategies described in the statement. So let the agents i ∈ D use these strategies and assume that j ∈ M deviates to e j > 0. Since
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the statement with the help of two lemmatas.
Lemma 3. For any
Proof: First notice that the two candidate expressions for E N are well defined, because we can write
Summing up (3) over all i ∈ M and rearranging yields
Summing up (3) over all i ∈ D, inserting (17) and rearranging, yields the following quadratic equation
From here we obtain
Proof: Suppose M * = and E N = Υ − Υ 2 − Φ. Following (16), we can write E N = Υ − X 2 + Y , where
Since the function f (x) = x is increasing in its argument and Y ≥ 0, we have E N ≤ Υ − X 2 , where
The remainder of the proof distinguishes these two cases and shows that each of them leads to E D ≤ 0, contradicting Lemma 1.
Using (17) we obtain
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemmatas 3 and 4. Q.E.D.
A.5 The derivatives mentioned in Subsection 3.3
Remember that by Proposition 2, |D * | ≥ 1 holds.
Proof: Let β ∈ (0, β). Suppose |D * | = 1. From (16), we have E N = Υ + X 2 , where X 2 is defined in (19). This implies that
23 Assume E N = Λ M * B 1 . (17) and Proposition 2 imply E N > Λ M * B 1 , a contradiction. Thus
Suppose |D * | > 1. We have that
with Σ > 0. Taking the derivative we obtain
Proof: Let β ∈ (0, β). We have that
as Ω ∈ (0, 1). Suppose |D * | = 1. From Claim 1, we know that E N = Λ N * B 1 . This implies that
Suppose |D * | > 1 and remember that this implies that Σ > 0. Using Claim 1, we obtain β
Hence we have that
Introducing E N /B 1 from Claim 1 and rearranging yields 1 2
Multiplying by 2 Σ and collecting terms we obtain 1 2
Squaring and cancelling terms yields finally that
which is true for β > 0. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove Proposition 4 in two steps. In Claim 3 we confirm that the candidate strategies in (8) and (9) are indeed an equilibrium. Second, we prove in Claim 4 uniqueness of the equilibrium in pure strategies.
Claim 3. The candidate efforts described in Proposition 4 constitute an equilibrium.
Proof: Denote the vector of individual candidate equilibrium efforts by e * . Consider an agent i and assume that all other agents exert the candidate equilibrium effort e * j for any j = i. Agent i chooses e i ≥ 0 in order to maximize (1). Since we already know that active agents do not have an incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium effort, consider inactive agents.
Consider first agent i ∈ {m * + 1, . . . , m}. The first order condition evaluated at e * i
which by (10) is negative. Hence e * i = 0 is indeed a best response.
Consider next agent i ∈ {d * + 1, . . . , n}. The first order condition evaluated at e * i
which using the definition of Ω and (11) can be shown to be negative. Thus e * i = 0 is indeed a best response. Q.E.D. . Notice that j and k must both be strictly larger than zero. 25 Moreover, Lemma 1 implies that we can focus on 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ j < d. In each equilibrium we indicate total effort by E H and E J ; and distinguish
similarly Ω H and Ω J .
In equilibrium H the following participation conditions must hold
while in equilibrium J we must have, when k < m,
and for k = m,
Notice that the conditions referring to agent m imply that E J > E H . We establish now that Ω J > Ω H holds.
This last expression is strictly larger than zero if and only if
the last expression is implied by the participation condition of agent m in equilibrium H. Lastly, notice that E J > E H and Ω J > Ω H , on one hand, and the participation conditions of agent d in both equilibria, on the other, imply the following. For k < m,
In both cases we reach the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
The above two claims complete the proof of Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
We start proving that E N is continuous on [0, 1].
Proof: The statement follows from four claims. 
Q.E.D.
Since the exit of the contestant(s) with the highest ability is covered by Claim 6, we next show continuity of total effort when, given a set of active agents, the most inefficient advantaged agent with ability different from contestant 1 ceases to be active.
Proof: From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that (7) is the root of (18). We show that at the value for β in question, (18) is the same as a similar expression defined for the case in which agent m * has exited. Thus the root must be the same, too.
Rearranging yields We turn now to show continuity of total effort when, given a set of active agents, a disadvantaged agent becomes active or ceases to be active. We are now in a position to apply Weierstrass' extreme value theorem, which guarantees that for any (α, B), there is β * ∈ [0, 1] such that E N (β) attains a maximum at β * .
Moreover, given that E N (β) is constant on [β, 1] and Proposition 1 in Fang (2002) , which says that with the contest success function assumed the exclusion principle does not apply, we conclude that β * ∈ [0, β). Q.E.D.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
In order to simplify notation, in this proof we drop the subindex ε. Consider β ∈ (0,β]
for which total effort is given by (7). In order to compute the derivative with respect to β rewrite (7) as follows 
Summarizing, we have that β * > 0 if one of the following holds:
The fact that γδ ≤ γ < ζ with the first inequality being strict whenever |M * | > 1 implies the statement. Q.E.D.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
The fact that condition (15) implies that β * > 0 follows from straightforward algebraic simplification of condition (14).
Suppose β * > 0. Notice that E N (β = 0) > E N (β = β) by Proposition 5. Note also that in between these values for β the function E N (β) is twice differentiable. The fact that when β goes to zero, ∂ E N /∂ β > 0 follows then from noticing that in between these values for β the function E N (β) is strictly concave and that the condition on the derivative implies condition (15).
26
The last statement follows from observing that the upper bound of condition (15) is strictly larger than the lower bound.
Q.E.D. 26 The second derivative of total effort is negative, 
